Marianne's appeal from this order is addressed on a related appeal decided herewith (Matter of Cassini, Also unavailing is the objectants' contention that the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of CPLR 321 (c) is to protect an unknowing client whose counsel failed to inform the client of counsel's suspension or disability. His last will and testament was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County{**182 AD3d at 17} (see Matter of Cassini, 95 AD3d 1311, 1312 [2012]). The case John Barnosky, pro se, and Farrel Fritz, Uniondale (Robert Harper of counsel), for John Barnosky and others, objectants-respondents. three witnesses. According to Harper, the court granted Marianne time to retain new counsel, scheduling an appearance on the cross motion for March 2, 2016. That action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party (see Cassini v Belmont, 2012 WL 3594378, 2012 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 6167 [Aug. 22, 2012, No. The objectants argue that Marianne is not aggrieved by the order appointing a receiver since the Surrogate's Court determined that OCI and CPL are estate assets and Marianne is no longer an estate fiduciary. She was most certainly on notice that she needed new counsel when she appeared, accompanied by McKay, at a conference before the Surrogate's Court on June 8, 2016. One of those motions was to adjourn the trial. Harper, in an affirmation submitted in connection with a later motion, asserted that no attorney from either RK or Sills Cummis appeared on the return date of the withdrawal motions even though an appearance typically was required on the return date of a motion in the Surrogate's Court. ", Eight days later, on March 24, 2016, having received nothing further from the Surrogate's Court, Kelly wrote to Keller by email, asserting that he was reminding the court that RK had not received a decision on its withdrawal motion in the accounting proceeding. Marianne Nestor According to Harper, during that conference, Shifrin asked Marianne whether she had undertaken any efforts to retain new counsel. She claimed that she was never informed of a date when her opposition to the cross motion would be due, or when it was to be rescheduled. In this regard, we note that the previous Surrogate had granted a lengthy delay in the trial partly due to Reppert's representation that he was required to undergo surgery. Meanwhile, Marianne filed a petition in the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County, for judicial settlement of her intermediate account as executor, covering the period from March 17, 2006, through December 21, 2010, and listing total{**182 AD3d at 18} gross assets of more than $56 million (hereinafter the accounting proceeding). Furthermore, Marianne's decision to absent herself from the trial after her motion for an adjournment was denied reflects her affirmative decision to forgo appearing at the trial at all rather than to represent herself at the trial without the aid of counsel. Corp. v Pellicane (78 AD3d 622), which involved a Florida statute providing that two years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, nor the beneficiaries shall generally be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent (see Fla Stat Ann 733.710[1]). However, the parties here do not argue that Kelly's unhampered ability to continue to represent Marianne precludes the application of CPLR 321 (c) as the result of Reppert's personal circumstances.

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